29 Oct 2018 - PK-LQP 737 MAX-8 crashed into Java Sea
On 29 October 2018, a Lion Air 737 MAX-8, PK-LQP (43000/7058) FF 30/7/18, departed Jakarta (WIII), Indonesia, runway 25L, at 23:21 UTC (06:21 local time).
After two minutes the plot from flight radar (see below) shows a drop in altitude from 2150ft to 1600ft and increase in speed to 334kts G/S. 3 minutes after takeoff, the crew requested to return to Jakarta; ATC granted the request.
The aircraft turned to the North East heading out over the Java Sea and climbed to 5,400ft but not holding a steady altitude. It then descended over the sea and was lost from radar 12 minutes after departure.
The two month old aircraft broke up and sank on impact. The wreckage is under 30m of water. Flight JT610 was enroute from Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang with 181 passengers and 8 crew members on board. There were no survivors.
The weather conditions were good and it was daylight.
WIII 282330Z 16003KT 8000 SCT020 27/25 Q1010 NOSIG=
The KNKT reported on 9 Nov that the angle of attack sensor had been replaced the previous day (28 Oct) following pilot reports of unreliable airspeed. The pilots of the previous flight experienced a 20 dgeree difference in the LH AOA sensor.
The CVR was recovered on 14 Jan under 8m of mud and 30m of water thanks to the pinger still being active after 73 days.
*** Updated 20 Nov 2018 ***
The KNKT released their Preliminary Report on 28 Nov 2018
According to factual information during the investigation, the KNKT identified findings as follows:
This is an alleged copy of the maintenance report that is circulating the internet. It is unconfirmed.
"Airspeed unreliable and alt disagree shown after take off. STS was also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference. Identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree. Decide to continue flying to CGK at FL280, landed safely rwy 25L"
On 7 Nov 2018 the FAA issue an Emergency AD (2018-23-51) and Boeing issue an Ops Manual Bulletin (TBC-19) for MAX Runaway Stabilizer procedure directing operators to “existing flight crew procedures" to address circumstances involving erroneous angle-of-attack sensor information.
FAA Emergency AD 2018-23-51 - This emergency AD was prompted by analysis performed by the manufacturer showing that if an erroneously high single angle of attack (AOA) sensor input is received by the flight control system, there is a potential for repeated nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer. This condition, if not addressed, could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible impact with terrain.
Ops Manual Bulletin TBC-19
This is a copy of the bulletin, it has a different reference (MLI-15) because it is with a different airline; TBC = The Boeing Company
On 22 Nov 2018 the KNKT released a presentation in Indonesian which included various FDR printouts. It showed that the Captains AoA indicated 20 degrees more than the F/Os AoA triggering the left stick shaker. There then followed various automatic nose down inputs which are presumed to be from MCAS. These inputs were counteracted by the crew with nose up trim until they ran out of trim authority.